

'Fix Us Up; Let Us Go Back,' Wounded Americans Plead

Never a Whimper in Advanced Dressing Stations and Every Doughboy Craves Another Chance to Hit Boches—Prisoners All Downhearted

By Caspar Whitney
(Special Cable to The Tribune)

(Copyright, 1918, by Tribune Association)
PARIS, July 22.—"The Kaiser told you there were no Americans here, eh?" said a young American army doctor, bending over a Boche and bandaging a bayonet breast wound that indicated the vigor behind the thrust.

It was at an advanced dressing station, improvised in the open on a roadside in the battered end of a small village which up to the morning of the Franco-American attack had been in the possession of the Germans. On all sides were wrecked houses and shell-torn streets, which proved the accuracy of the short Allied artillery preparation.

Around us lay boys whose wounds had been dressed while they were awaiting their turn to be carried to the ambulance station and thence to the hospital over the low ridge directly in front of the long, new-made, yet now well-worn path which disappeared among the shattered walls, others being brought in from the battle-swept area immediately ahead on stretchers carried mostly by Boche prisoners, to which practical use they were put before being sent to join several other prisoner groups herded to the rear. In the country beyond us, where Americans had first encountered and surprised the Boches, was the tangled litter of war-rifles, bayonets, ammunition, helmets, chiefly Boche clothing, blankets—and shell holes in plenty where the boys had fought the Boche back.

"Walking Cases" Confident.

Beside us the winding road seemed to overflow with the grim phases of war making, a burning tank neatly mowed a way forward through the busy medics and the uncomplaining wounded; three handy little horses drawing ammunition carts were pressing closely for passage, while over to their honorous hub of the aeroplanes was broken by the whining song of the shells, some coming, some going and some finding a nearby mark to deepen the tone of the tragic panorama and further to swell the toll which young America is beginning to pay in order to help rid the world of Boche Kultur.

And painfully "walking cases" picked their way, filtering through a lane made by a fresh battalion awaiting call and meanwhile resting, eating, easing, or even coming to their luckless mates and as ready to chaff the slightly wounded. At crossroads only a few kilometers away two young uniformed women of the Red Cross were seen. One of them hailed their car and gave out cigarettes and tobacco to the high joy of the passing American and French soldiers.

No Cries of Pain.

Farther back on the main road an ever moving dust enveloped column of motor trucks speeding day and night to the line with food, ammunition and guns. There was no outcry or alarm in this dressing station, where the rack of the grievous wound had replaced the eager thrill of the morning. There were only patience and courage and the desire to mend quickly in order to "get at 'em again."

There was the expressed sentiment of the many wounded boys with whom I talked on the line during the first and second days of the present offensive.

"The fellows keep on going?" asked one shot through the thigh, whom I found lying at the edge of the field. When told of the time results of the advance in which he had taken part, he said: "Well, then, I've no kick coming!"

"There are plenty more like us back there, and we're going to put Mr. Boche in the tobergen," continued another, in a low, slow, difficult speech of one who shot through the breast. "We've got their number," literally shouted a youngster with a shattered arm, lying alongside a Boche man in a gun he and his comrades had silenced.

"And we are going to give them hell and then some more." Such is the spirit of these boys, the majority of them not having been under fire. It certainly gives reason for pride and confidence.

From Soissons to Château Thierry, though his numbers and his part, of course, have been small, the man engaged with the battle line and the men engaged, the American has done that part thoroughly well, and we shall shortly have further and increasing reason to be proud of him and his fighting spirit, his more and more he takes his place in the forefront.

Particularly was I impressed with the average soldier boy's easy mind just as he goes in and comes out of the battle, which is sure indication of the man's mettle. We knew the Americans would show courage, and now we know that they also have the power of composure to prove the excellence of their training and discipline.

Such assignments as these boys had been at very important moments and they have done as well as the best, which is praise indeed. Yet must we not permit complacent overconfidence, of which already some evidence, because of our boys' good work.

It is a long road to the Rhine, and we have but just entered upon it. There is still much for the boys to learn of the hard, complex fighting game, and America must prepare herself to pay the high price which the aggressive spirit of her sons will entail. We may feel, however, confident in their learning quickly and doing their full share in the present drive on the Boche across the Château Thierry salient.

Boche Plan a Failure

We are on the eve of very interesting developments, which the Germans push east toward Epernay inaugurated in giving Poch an opening for which masterfully he has been patiently waiting, doubtless feeling that German stupidity would finally reveal itself.

The lumbering Boche plan of taking Paris, via Rheims and Epernay, has petered out after using half their reserves, and now further drafts on the reserves are being made to stop the Allied advance east from Soissons to the Château Thierry front.

Of the results of yesterday's fighting this line, most significant was the retention by the Franco-American elements of substantially what they had taken in the first day's attack, despite nearly 100,000 men the Boche had pushed into his reserves.

Doubtless the Boche will harder and perhaps regain some territory if he pays the price in men, but now he is using reserves which were being held for a master stroke in an action that cannot result very seriously to the Allies if full success is not at-

tained, while it is likely to be little short of being disastrous to the Boche and the complete upheaval of his campaign plans.

The Boche, in fact, has been placed in a position from which he can extricate himself if at all only by lavish expenditure of the reserves he has been counting upon to hammer out this summer decisions he seeks and fancied he could secure.

Enemy Is Well Fed

Not the least in the Allied gain in the fizzle of the Boche push to the east and retreat from the Soissons-Château Thierry line is the influence in the morale of the German soldiers, which, judging from a prisoner just taken, seems none too good. The many groups I saw appeared dazed and spiritless, showing relief at being safe, and were eager to carry stretchers or do other work in token of their complete and willing surrender.

As a rule their voices were weary and disheartened, and some expressed as much in words. Yet without exception they were in good physical condition, looking well fed and clothed, and especially well shod were all the Boches alive and dead I saw.

Apparently tales of a "starving" army are features of the Boche peace offensive, of which we shall soon hear much. Meanwhile there will be bitter, costly fighting during the process of smashing the Boche where the Allies can smash him next spring.

Germans Burn Towns as They Plan Retreat

Continued from page 1

rious places, their limit comes more quickly than ever before.

A diminutive Scotch soldier, whose bare knees were bandaged and bloody, said to The Tribune's correspondent: "The Huns are getting their belly full. They'll shoot like 'ell till you gets near 'em. Then they throw up their hands and either surrender or run."

The British troops that Jock belonged to went into action on the line southwest of Rheims yesterday, encountering a fresh Bavarian division, who, like themselves, had come up from a totally different sector.

In all my talks with soldiers of any of the four nationalities in the present battle there had been praise for the other fellow. A New York private, with a bullet through his shoulder, who was advancing to a French liaison when hit, said: "These Frenchmen sure know this war game." An hour later I met a poilu who said: "The Americans are marvellous."

It has been the same everywhere when one nationality has been drawn into conversation about their neighbors.

The fact that the Crown Prince was forced to borrow divisions from Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, opposite the British front, is confirmation that the Kaiser's son suffered terrible losses during the last week. Like a gambler in a run of hard luck, he is now forced to borrow funds from the fellow gambler on his right in an effort to save himself from going completely broke.

The Imperial Crown Prince, therefore, is facing the danger of a rout and the situation depends on how much his Bavarian cousin will loan.

If the luck of the Imperial Prince returns he may be able to stop the run of bad luck on the natural positions stated above.

This day dawned with an entirely new face on the war. Exactly a week ago the powerful Teutonic army was starting as great and daring an offensive as any single army in the history of the world ever attempted.

The German High Command in a five-day struggle culminating Friday in a disastrous retreat across the River Marne, now followed by a further withdrawal, may now be said utterly to have failed in the one last chance to do what Germany set out to do, dominate the world by force of arms.

Tens of thousands, the flower of the German army, lie dead to-day over the ninety-mile front stretching roughly southward from the Aisne to the Marne, and following the course of that world famed stream to the vicinity of the village of Troissy, then northeastward again almost to the wooded hills of the Argonne.

Tens of thousands more lie wounded in German hospitals, thousands more are prisoners, and the German High Command with the remainder are facing almost certainly a period of hardship which never was contemplated.

The proud German arms suffered the culminating blow when forced to accept at the Marne the same humiliating defeat her weaker ally, Austria, experienced at the hands of the Italians at the Piave a short time before. More humiliating still is the fact that the weather aided the Allied forces but little at the Marne. It was the combination of pure valor of the Allied soldiers following the masterful strategy of General Poch, the man who took the helm of the inter-Allied ship in the dark and stormy days of last March

when it seemed as though the numerically overwhelming German hordes would submerge France and crush the Allied armies before America could throw her weight into the war. To-day finds the constantly growing Allied forces not defending their very life, but fighting under circumstances in which the man at the helm, by superior strategy, has beaten the powerful enemy and is now dictating the enemy's movements.

Germans Picked Troops

Throughout the war the world has been forced to admire German "methodism." It was the methodical German battle plan, methodical almost to stubbornness, that brought defeat during the last six days.

Beginning in March of this year, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, given overwhelming man power by reason of Russia's withdrawal, had prepared to begin the battle which they believed would end the war quickly.

Every German division by that time had been stripped of its best men, who were placed in specially trained shock divisions. The chaff was left for simpler work, such as holding the lines where the man material could be older or younger or not otherwise physically capable men. The enemy planned for specially drilled storm troop units whose specialty would be making attacks in dense masses.

The Franco-British forces and the comparatively scant number of American troops in France at the beginning of March braced themselves for the first shock, which came against the British on March 21 on the Somme, with a later diversion around Ypres.

Second Phase of Great Battle

The second phase of the great battle came on May 27, when the Storm-troopers crossed the Aisne against the French, advancing almost to the Marne, taking Soissons and halting on the outskirts of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets on the west. The third phase was the drive on Compiègne, with the eventual objective of getting close enough to Paris to make the capital untenable by long range gunfire. The fourth phase, on July 15, the greatest blow of all, fell between Château Thierry and the Main de Massiges.

The first and second phases of the grand final battle, which only stopped long enough between phases to allow Hindenburg to regroup his forces and prepare the sectors minutely with all the latest science of war for an attack, were decidedly costly to German man power, but successful for the tactical advantage gained. The third phase was a bloody check. The fourth was a German catastrophe.

The German High Command, evidently underrating the American reinforcements since March 21, and certainly underrating the Franco-American valor, planned to trap the Allied command and was in turn trapped. Fifty shock divisions, or about a million of Germany's highest trained man power, were thrown against the line last Monday between Château Thierry and Main de Massiges.

Hindenburg did not attack Rheims, which forms a sharp salient in the center of the fifty-mile battle line. Instead, with the right wing stretching from Château Thierry to the vicinity west of Rheims, and the left wing stretching from Fort Pompelle, southeast of Rheims, eastward to the Main de Massiges, he struck with the left wing's full force toward the eastward course of the Marne, which is from fifteen to thirty miles southward, hoping to take the river cities, Epernay and Châlons.

(Special Cable to The Tribune)
(Copyright, 1918, The Tribune Association)
WITH THE FRENCH ARMIES, July 22.—Next to the victorious advance of the Franco-American troops on the line from the Aisne to the Marne, the Anglo-French bombing squadrons deserve immense credit for the Germans' precipitate retreat to the north bank of the Marne.

Constant bombing of the enemy's pontoon bridges, both day and night since last Monday morning prevented the transportation of a single enemy cannon across the river, forcing the Germans to fight with the disadvantage of long-range gun fire from the opposite bank. The fire was inaccurate, owing to a lack of proper communication with the gunners miles away, and caused serious losses among the Germans with their own shells.

Disheartens Invaders

This, added to the demoralizing effect of being isolated on the south bank and with constant bombing attacks on the pontoons, their only communication for food supplies, took all the fight out of the Feldgrauen before they were ordered to escape.

The attack toward Epernay was not only completely blocked in a remarkably brief time by the poilus, but they were able to retake the heights dominating the river before the retreat. With the enemy locked in a narrow pocket, which he was unable to enlarge, he would have been forced to retreat eventually, even without the danger from the Aisne-Marne advance.

The escape made early Saturday was harassed continually by French gunfire from the vicinity of Reuilly, where the steep hillsides afforded some protection from the shells.

The Germans' losses were heaviest before they reached the river. The fewness of the prisoners taken was due to the rear guards, who fought furiously to effect the main body's escape. Most of these fought until slain by the advancing poilus.

The Franco-American advance between the Aisne and the Marne is now menacing the entire German forces in the great salient. The Soissons-Château Thierry road has now been cut by the Franco-Americans and the long-range guns are able to play their destructive fire on the roads feeding and supplying

the enemy forces in the salient, where they are bottled up.

Simultaneously, with the right wing resting on the north bank of the Marne for several miles and thence upward toward Rheims, he struck southward again in a converging attack toward Montmirail, which is roughly fifteen miles southeast of Château Thierry. The thrust toward Montmirail, which would make it appear that the powerful Allied forces on the German right bank were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Montmirail was merely a demonstration in an effort to make the Allied chief believe that Paris was threatened and immediately mass his reserves for the protection of the capital. Then, when the Allied reserves were drawn away from the "harmless" massed between the German right wing and Paris, it was Hindenburg's intention to turn the backs of the soldiers forming the right wing on the Allied reserves and march back were striking straight toward Paris via the Seine Valley, was not Hindenburg's intention at all.

Real Hindenburg Plan

This Hindenburg would have enveloped the almost impregnable mountain of Rheims, lying about ten miles south of the martyred city. He would have attained the entire course of the Marne River from Chateau Thierry to Châlons and probably further eastward. He would have held this line, which is easy to hold, while preparing the mountain of Rheims as a base and the Marne as a flank.

This week's dispatches have already told what happened. The left wing, which was the foreseen Monday morning by General Gouraud's army in the Champagne, was terribly slaughtered and held in its tracks. In this defense some American battalions participated with the poilus with the highest credit.

Crossed the Marne

Hindenburg's right wing had better success. It crossed the Marne Monday morning with pontoons on a ten-mile front between the villages of Fossy and Dormancy, though with the loss of some tanks, and the French and British bombing squadrons above.

The advance was held everywhere by the doughboys and poilus after slight progress had been made. Near Fossy the Americans drove the Germans back into the river. Southeast of Rheims the attack was more successful. Heavy pressure caused the Franco-Italian troops to fall back, but they, too, eventually held.

With the right wing's attack thus checked on its right and left on Monday, Hindenburg, on Tuesday, ordered the capture of Epernay in the stubborn "methodism" for which the Germans are noted. The entire available force on the right wing converged both north and south of the Marne, where the river dips eastward toward Epernay. Bloody fighting continued Wednesday on both banks, with the French slowly pushed back by overwhelming numbers.

Epernay was being approached on Thursday, with Hindenburg vainly hoping to take the city, when the Franco-American counter drive began on a thirty-mile front between the Aisne and the Marne. The success of this drive, which still continues, is known over the world. The Franco-American forces at the first bound cut deep into the entire line on which Hindenburg had placed his "chaff" divisions. Hindenburg did not expect a lightninglike blow, nullifying in three days the grandiose strategy which he had planned would impose on the Allied commander-in-chief the duty of musing all available forces against a "false" march on Paris, down the Seine Valley.

The ponderous Hindenburg strategy, which failed at the beginning, but the method of which had been worked out, and therefore should succeed, despite everything, proved the fiercest and undoing. The Allied commander-in-chief, who bided his time wearing down a superior enemy in five months in purely defensive fighting, struck Thursday morning with complete surprise.

As the Allied line advanced the German attacks in the vicinity of Epernay ceased. The German forces, estimated as eight divisions south of the Marne, facing disaster if they retreated, moved a second time. In addition to fifty divisions used in the disastrous offensive beginning six days ago, the German High Command was forced to throw possibly twenty more into the breach between the Aisne and the Marne to meet the Franco-American offensive.

Figuring on a basis of 210 German divisions on the Western front at the beginning of the offensive, where probably seventy were used during the last week, there remains about 140 divisions. Counting the divisions necessary to hold the long battle line from the sea to Switzerland at approximately 110, Hindenburg still has about thirty fresh divisions to meet the Allied reserves.